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Abstract 
We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies in which 
agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may 
not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. In this context, we investigate procedural and end-state 
principles of fairness, their implications and relations. To do so, we explore “procedural” allocation 
rules represented by a composition of a rights-assignment mechanism (to assign each profile of claims 
individual property rights over the endowment) and Walrasian, or other individually rational, exchange 
rule. Using variants of fairness based on no-envy as end-state principles, we provide axiomatic 
characterizations of the three focal egalitarian mechanisms, known in the literature on rationing 
problems as constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses, and proportional mechanisms. Our 
results are connected to focal contributions in political philosophy, and also provide rationale for 
market-based environ- mental policy instruments (such as cap-and-trade schemes and personal carbon 
trading) and moral foundation for the three proposals to allocate GHG emission rights known as the 
equal per capita sharing, the polluter pays principle and the equal burden sharing (the victims pay 
principle). 
 
Keywords: fairness, claims, no-envy, individual rationality, egalitarianism, efficiency, Walrasian 
exchange. 
 
JEL classification: D63, D71. 
 
                                                           
1 Seoul National University. 
2 Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Spain; Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, 
Belgium. 
 
 
1 Introduction
Fairness and distributive justice is the primary concern in practical procedures
for property rights disputes. Very often used in the final allocation of rights are
proportional division, equal division and equal sacrifice. Examples can be found
in numerous institutional setups including laws, social and religious norms, and
agreed conventions, such as bankruptcy laws, divorce laws, court settlements for
accident damage, international conventions on environmental problems, domestic
or international resolutions on contested natural resources,1 etc. It is important,
especially in the case of agreed conventions, for the enforceability of the resolu-
tion whether the division rule adopted is perceived as being fair by the disputers.
Indeed, this issue of fairness is at the heart of the recent failure to agree on a new
international framework dealing with Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions after the
Kyoto protocol. The above three division rules form the three prominent proposals
for the allocation of GHG emission rights, domestic or international.2 Countries
in different stages of economic development have different perceptions of fairness
and support different rules. Making the gap closer and reaching a final resolution
is a political economy problem. However, the core issue is an ethical one and
investigating it from the perspective of normative science will help facilitating the
political resolution.3
The normative foundation of allocation schemes, such as the above three divi-
sion rules, has been a key subject in the literature of fair allocation. Nevertheless,
most studies in this literature either focus on the issue of allocating a single good
(money), dismissing the issue of fair initial allocation and its influence on the final
allocation after the subsequent interactions among claimants (e.g., O’Neill, 1982;
1See Ansink and Weikard (2009) for the case of contested water rights and Ansink (2011) for
the case of sharing arctic resources.
2The proposal to allocate on an “equal per capita basis” (see Carley et al., 1991, Neumayer,
2000, Saltzman, 2010) corresponds to equal division, the polluter pays principle (paraphrased as
“you broke it, you fix it”; e.g., Singer 2002, 2006) to proportional division, and the principle of
equal burden sharing (Posner and Weisbach, 2010) to equal sacrifice. Equal per capita allocation
is also advocated by the so-called contraction and convergence proposal; see Meyer (2000) and
Starkey (2008).
3There are quite a few authors who have pursued normative investigation on GHG emission
reduction and the allocation of emission rights. Gardiner (2004) and Starkey (2008) provide an
extensive outline. See also Margalioth (2012) and Posner and Weisbach (2010). The ethics of
intergenerational distribution is an important topic, which is not considered in our current inves-
tigation. See, for instance, Llavador, Roemer, Silvestre (2010) or Roemer (2011) for extensive
treatments on this topic.
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Young, 1988; Moulin, 2000; Thomson, 2003, 2013), or assume a fixed initial
distribution of property rights, without dispute, and investigate end-state fairness
(e.g., Pazner and Schmeidler, 1974, 1978; Thomson and Varian, 1985; Roemer,
1986; Thomson, 2011).4 Therefore, they are somewhat limited to apply for the in-
vestigation of fairness (both end-state and procedural) in some environments with
conflicting claims, or property rights dispute.
Our objectives are, first, to construct a comprehensive framework where one
can investigate fairness in the initial allocation of rights on disputed properties,
fairness in the transaction of rights, and fairness of the end-state allocation, and,
second, to investigate implications of the three categories of fairness and their
relations. Our model dealing with disputed properties is an extended model of
exchange economies, the extension allowing for conflicts over properties. More
precisely, agents have preferences over the consumption space with a finite num-
ber of goods, and they also have initial claims on those goods. Furthermore, the
available endowment of each good in the economy may not be sufficient to satisfy
all claims; i.e., the sum of individual claims either exceeds or equals the endow-
ment. In other words, we consider rationing problems with “multiple” goods when
agents have preferences over those goods.
The end-state fairness will be formalized in this context as three variants of
no-envy, probably the concept with longest tradition in the theory of fair alloca-
tion (Foley, 1967; Kolm, 1972; Varian, 1974), used also by a moral philosopher,
Ronald Dworkin (1981, p.285) as a basic test for resource egalitarian allocations.
No-envy is satisfied if no agent prefers the consumption by anyone else to her
own. The same comparative notion of fairness, defined through interpersonal
comparisons of (absolute) sacrifices gives rise to the notion of sacrifice-no-envy.
Likewise, we define relative no-envy through interpersonal comparison of relative
sacrifices (or reward rates). No-envy conceptualizes the impartial spectator’s point
of view, à la Adam Smith, by necessitating the equal standard of fairness through
the senses of all individuals equally. A different, yet related, conceptualization
of the impartial spectator is the contractarian construct of veil of ignorance by
John Harsanyi (1953, 1955) and John Rawls (1971), which enforces the decision
maker to evaluate the outcome through the individual standards of well-being.5
4There exist generalizations of the rationing model introduced by O’Neill (1982) to a multidi-
mensional setting, but therein, even though claims refer to multiple types of assets, the endowment
to be allocated is still unidimensional (e.g., Ju, Miyagawa, and Sakai, 2007).
5While no-envy provides a specific standard of fair allocations, the contractarian theories only
provide the environment of impartial decision making and leave it up to the “rational” decision
maker to come up with the exact standard of fair allocations, namely, the utilitarian allocation for
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However, unlike the contractarian theories, no-envy does not rely on “cardinal”
preferences; it is based purely on “ordinal” preferences.6
Our main results characterize procedural rules that lead to fair (and efficient)
end-state allocations. We shall focus on the family of market-based rules that
solve the problems of allocating disputed properties with two successive proce-
dures: the first procedure, the adjudication of conflicting claims, determines an
initial allocation of property rights , and the second procedure of Walrasian or
other individually rational exchange from the initial allocation determines a final
allocation. Our main results show that the first procedures taking the forms of
the three focal rationing mechanisms, known as constrained equal awards, con-
strained equal losses, and proportional, are the unique solidaristic ones that lead
to fair end-state allocations.7 The three mechanisms have a long tradition of use
to solve (standard) rationing problems, which can be traced back to Aristotle and
Maimonides (e.g., Thomson, 2003). Although they assign property rights in
quite different ways, they all achieve equality with different perspectives; namely,
equality of the absolute amounts of properties, losses from claims, or relative
amounts. Our characterization results give a new rationale for the three egalitar-
ian mechanisms based on end-state notions of fairness.
1.1 Placing our contribution
Practical handling of disputed properties often assign individual rights over the
properties relying on claims, and leave individuals some freedom of exchanging
their rights, which leads to a final allocation. This is, for instance, the rationale un-
derlying cap-and-trade systems for permit allocations, as well as some other pop-
ular market-based environmental policies (e.g., Brennan and Scoccimarro 1999;
Stavins, 2003). The end-state is determined through the combination of two pro-
cedures: the assignment of rights and the subsequent exchange. The first proce-
dure treats all cases with identical claims and resource constraints equally; pref-
erences are not considered, which makes the procedure informationally simple,
as well as impartial. Although this procedure is represented by a reduced form
of an (rights-)assignment mechanism (a function mapping each claims problem
John Harsanyi and the maximin principle for John Rawls.
6More general, and possibly individualized notions of fairness criteria are studied by Corchón
and Iturbe-Ormaetxe (2001).
7Solidarity is modeled here by the combination of two axioms, known as resource monotonicity
and consistency, as previously suggested by Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2006, 2012), among
others.
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into a single allocation), we do not rule out decentralized decision procedures,
e.g., non-cooperative games. It is required, though, that the decentralized pro-
cedures have a unique prediction, or a unique “equilibrium” outcome as well as
satisfying our basic solidarity axioms. Examples can be found in Dagan, Serrano
and Volij (1997, 1999) among others. The second exchange procedure is based
on decentralized individual decisions within the boundaries of the socioeconomic
institution the agents belong to; Walrasian market exchange is the best known
example, although many others exist. It is again described in a reduced form of
social choice rules, for simplicity. The procedure can take a form of decentralized
decision procedures such as non-cooperative games as long as the predicted equi-
librium outcomes meet the basic individual rationality; uniqueness is not required
in the second procedure. Examples of such procedures abound in the literature of
market games and implementation theory.8 The combination of the two proce-
dures provides the advantage of simple information processing and decentralized
decision making. This motivates our focus on procedural allocation rules.
Conflicts in property ownership are at the center of our resource allocation
problems. The liberal theories of private ownership, most notably developed by
John Locke (e.g., Locke, 1976) and Robert Nozick (e.g., Nozick, 1974), are too
restrictive (in the case of Locke) or too lenient (in the case of Nozick) to pro-
vide a useful guideline in our framework. In particular, Nozick’s extension of
Locke’s theory gives a green signal to any resolution satisfying some minimal re-
spect of the claims when they are representative of rights coming from the thesis
of “self-ownership”. It can admit even an extremely biased resolution of conflict-
ing claims.9 Our investigation may be viewed as an alternative way of extending
Locke’s theory in a highly stylistic framework of claims problems. We take ad-
vantage of the extensive literature on the claims-problems model that has served
as a simple, yet rich, environment for studying allocative fairness during the last
thirty years.
In a similar line of investigation, Roemer (1987, 1988, 1989), Moulin (1987,
1990), and Roemer and Silvestre (1989, 1993) propose generalizations of Locke’s
theory in the framework of common resources under a decreasing-returns-to-scale
technology, which gives rise to the so-called tragedy of the commons. The alloca-
tion rules proposed in these works respect Locke’s thesis based on self-ownership:
8The most powerful notion of decentralizability in this literature is based on dominant strategy
equilibrium and is known as strategy-proofness. Examples of strategy-proof exchange rules can
be found in Barberà and Jackson (1995) among others.
9See Otsuka (2003, pp. 23-24) for the same line of criticism against Nozick, with regard to the
acquisition of the outside world.
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that is, they coincide with the unlimited appropriation outcome in the case of a
constant returns to scale technology, the case satisfying the Lockean proviso. Nev-
ertheless unlike Nozick’s radical generalization, they all have egalitarian features.
It turns out that the so-called “Proportional” and “Nash dominator” mechanisms
(e.g., Roemer, 1989) singled-out in this literature are similar to our proportional
and equal award mechanisms, respectively.
Somewhat related, Gibbard (1976) and Grunebaum (1987) propose “equal
rights” or “public (or joint) ownership” of unowned properties to be the baseline
upon which the appropriation should be judged.10 Moulin and Roemer (1989),
in a production economy model, investigate implications of the baseline of pub-
lic ownership without denying the thesis of self-ownership. Their axiomatic ap-
proach shows that the axioms for public ownership and self-ownership, together
with other standard axioms, imply a unique welfare-egalitarian outcome. This re-
sult, which has a similar flavor to our results, suggests that a fair assignment of
property ownership, implicitly assumed through the requirement of their axioms,
implies egalitarianism.11 Interestingly, their model assumes a single representa-
tive utility function and, due to this feature, their axiom of self-ownership, which
is essentially an order preservation property, coincides with no-envy. All their
axioms are for end-state rules and they do not deal with the issue of procedural
assignment of ownership rights.
In our model, claims can be viewed as representing the rights based on the
thesis of self-ownership. In our procedural approach, assuming the basic con-
dition of claims boundedness captures minimally the thesis of self-ownership.12
The axiom of self-ownership, proposed by Moulin and Roemer (1989), is similar
to an order-preservation property of rights-assignment mechanisms, which we do
not impose from the outset because it is implied by other basic axioms. Our re-
source monotonicity axiom (for rights-assignment mechanisms) may be compared
to their axiom of public ownership, called “technology monotonicity”. However,
10Nozick sets the baseline to be the state where the unowned properties are unowned; their
appropriation, according to Nozick, gives the appropriator the entitlement to the properties as long
as no one is harmed relative to the baseline. Roemer (1996, Chapter 6) gives a comprehensive
overview of the related literature.
11Ownership rights in their paper are assumed to be respected when a mechanism satisfies cer-
tain axioms.
12When claims represent self-ownership rights, it is natural to require that no person should
get strictly more than her claims unless the claims of anyone else are fully compensated, that is,
compensating each person’s claims has the priority over any further compensation above claims.
In the framework of our claims problems (with no excess endowment over the total claims), such
a requirement is equivalent to claims-boundedness.
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our axioms are merely procedural requirements in the rights-assignment proce-
dure. They are not requirements for end-state rules as in Moulin and Roemer
(1989). Hence our axioms are far weaker than theirs; in fact, they are extremely
mild allowing for a rich spectrum of mechanisms, which means, in our procedural
approach, the baseline of public ownership and the thesis of self-ownership can be
met jointly without putting too much restriction on the choice of possible mecha-
nisms. To pin down a unique egalitarian mechanism in our main results, end-state
fairness plays a critical role.
Although our procedural approach was taken for fairly practical reasons, as
explained earlier, it is somewhat comparable to Nozick’s entitlement theory of
justice, which is proposed by Nozick (1973, 1974) as an objection to theories of
end-state justice. Interestingly, our main results elicit the complementarity be-
tween his procedural approach and the end-state approach. To wit, suppose that
individual claims in our framework represent the degrees of rightful ownership
resulting from the thesis of self-ownership. Under the case of property rights dis-
pute in our model, what would Nozick’s principle of just acquisition suggest? The
minimal implication of the thesis of self-ownership, a basis of Nozick’s theory,
in our first procedure is that respecting claims should get the highest priority so
that no one can get more properties than her claims unless everyone’s claims are
fully satisfied. In our first procedure, the total resources are in short of satisfying
all claims and so this minimal condition is equivalent to the claims-boundedness
assumption (everyone gets no more than her claims). Other than this minimal con-
dition, Nozick’s theory does not provide any further guideline for the resolution
of disputed property rights. Our results pin down a unique assignment mecha-
nism that embodies the principle of just acquisition, through the application of
Nozick’s principle of just transfer, namely an individually rational exchange rule
in the second procedure, and our end-state fairness axioms. On the other hand,
our results show that Nozick’s procedural approach can be useful for the “real-
ization” of end-state fairness. In particular, in the case of no-envy and sacrifice
no-envy, the procedural rules we characterize lead to fair and efficient allocations
when Walrasian exchange rule is used in the second procedure. In the case of
relative no-envy, we show that there is no procedural rule satisfying both fairness
and efficiency.
Therefore, our investigation provides an instance where a principle of end-
state fairness can facilitate the search of appropriate procedural principles of jus-
tice, in particular, principles of just acquisition, which constitute Nozick’s pro-
cedural (or historical) theory of justice and, conversely, Nozick’s theory can be
used to implement a principle of end-state fairness through informationally simple
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and decentralized procedures. This is why we claim that Nozick’s procedural ap-
proach, at least in our framework, is complementary with the end-state approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We set up the model in Section
2. We provide our main results (implications of fairness axioms and characteri-
zations of rationing mechanisms) in Section 3. We conclude in Section 4. For a
smooth passage, we defer some proofs and provide them in the appendix.
2 The model and definitions
Let N ≡ {1,2, . . .} be the set of potential agents and N ≡ {N ⊂ N : 2 ≤ |N| =
n< ∞} the family of finite non-empty subsets with at least two agents. There are
￿ privately appropriable and infinitely divisible goods. Each agent has a prefer-
ence relation Ri defined on R￿+, which satisfies the classical conditions of ratio-
nality (completeness and transitivity), continuity (lower and upper contour sets
are closed), strong monotonicity, and convexity (upper contour sets are convex).13
LetR denote the domain of such admissible preferences.14
A collective resource, or (social) endowment, Ω ∈ R￿++ is an ￿-vector indicat-
ing the available amounts of each good. Each agent has a claim (vector) ci ∈ R￿+
reflecting the entitlement from the endowment. We shall consider problems in
which the endowment is not sufficient to fully cover the claims of the agents. For-
mally, an economy e≡ (N,Ω,c,R) is composed by a set of agents N ∈N , a social
endowment Ω ∈ R￿++, a profile of individual claims c≡ (ci)i∈N ∈ Rn￿++, such that
Ω￿ ∑i∈N ci, and a profile of preference relations R≡ (Ri)i∈N ∈RN .15 Note that
if Ω = ∑i∈N ci, then e would be a standard (pure) exchange economy in which c
would correspond to the profile of individual endowments. Similarly, if ￿= 1 and
Ω<∑i∈N ci, then e would be a standard bankruptcy problem (e.g., O’Neill, 1982;
Thomson, 2003, 2013).
Let E denote the set of all economies, E (N) the set of economies with pop-
ulation N ∈N , E (Ω) the set of economies with endowment Ω, and E (N,Ω) ≡
13As usual, we denote by Pi the strict preference relation associated with Ri and the correspond-
ing indifference relation by Ii.
14As preferences are continuous, we can represent them by continuous real-valued functions,
and it is sometimes convenient to do so. For each i ∈ N, let Ui : R￿+ → R be such a representa-
tion of agent i’s preferences, and let U ≡ (Ui)i∈N . These representations will not have cardinal
significance.
15Our mathematical notation x ￿ y to relate vectors x,y ∈ R￿++ means that xi ≤ yi for each
i = 1, . . .￿, with at least one strict inequality. Thus, we are implicitly saying that no commodity
exhausts the corresponding aggregate claim.
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E (N)∩ E (Ω). Let E¯ ⊂ E be the set of exchange economies. We shall often
denote the claims profile for an exchange economy (the endowments profile) by
ω ≡ (ωi)i∈N instead of c ≡ (ci)i∈N , and will dismiss Ω in the description of the
economy.16
A feasible allocation for an economy e ∈ E (N,Ω) is a profile of individual
consumption bundles z ≡ (zi)i∈N ∈ Rn￿+ such that ∑i∈N zi = Ω. Let Z(N,Ω) ≡
{z ∈ Rn￿+ : ∑i∈N zi = Ω} be the set of all feasible allocations for economies in
E (N,Ω). Let Z ≡ ∪N∈N ∪Ω∈R￿++ Z(N,Ω). Given an economy e ≡ (N,Ω,c,R),
a feasible allocation z ∈ Z(N,Ω) is (Pareto) efficient if there is no other feasible
allocation z￿ that makes a person better off without making anyone else worse off,
that is, for some i ∈ N, z￿i Pi zi and for each j ∈ N\{i}, z￿j Ri z j. A social choice
rule S : E → Z associates with each economy e≡ (N,Ω,c,R) a non-empty set of
feasible allocations, i.e., a non-empty subset of Z(N,Ω). Finally, for reasons that
will become clear later in the text, we denote by [z]+ the truncated consumption
bundle after replacing the negative amounts of z ≡ (zi)i∈N ∈ Rn￿ by zero, i.e.,
[z]+ ≡ (max{0,zi})i∈N .
We shall be mostly interested in social choice rules that are characterized by
the following two consecutive procedures: First, an assignment procedure map-
ping the non-preference information (N,Ω,c) of each economy e ≡ (N,Ω,c,R)
into a profile of individual endowments ω ≡ (ωi)i∈N , and second, an exchange
procedure determining final allocations for the exchange economy (N,ω,R) ob-
tained in the first procedure. In doing so, we shall be able to scrutinize the rela-
tionship between principles of procedural justice (imposed in each of these two
procedures) and principles of end-state justice (imposed on the final allocations
determined by social choice rules).
2.1 Claims adjudication
A problem of adjudicating claims, briefly a claims problem, is defined by a set of
agents, a social endowment, and a profile of individual conflicting claims. For-
mally, it is a triple (N,Ω,c) such that Ω ￿ ∑i∈N ci. Let C denote the set of all
claims problems so defined.17 We use the notation C (N), C (Ω), and C (N,Ω) in
the same manner as used for E . An assignment mechanism ϕ : C → ∪N∈N Rn￿+
associates with each claims problem (N,Ω,c) ∈ C , “individual property rights”
16We denote zM ≡ (zi)i∈N , for each N ∈ N , M ⊂ N, and z ∈ Rn￿+ . Furthermore, for ease of
notation, if M = N \{i}, for some i ∈ N, we let z−i ≡ zM .
17Note that C ≡ {(N,Ω,c) : (N,Ω,c,R) ∈ E for some R≡ (Ri)i∈N ∈RN}.
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over the social endowment; that is, a feasible allocation ϕ (N,Ω,c) ∈ Z(N,Ω)
with ϕi (c) ￿ ci for each i ∈ N. This last inequality condition is called claims-
boundedness, and it requires that individual property rights do not exceed the ini-
tial entitlements specified by individual claims.18 We often refer to ϕ(N,Ω,c) as
the individual endowment set by mechanism ϕ for the claims problem (N,Ω,c).
An assignment mechanism ϕ then converts each economy e≡ (N,Ω,c,R) into an
exchange economy e￿ ≡ (N,ϕ(N,Ω,c),R).
We now define the three focal assignment mechanisms derived from the liter-
ature on claims problems.
The constrained equal awards mechanism ϕCEA maps each problem (N,Ω,c)∈
C into the allocation ϕCEA(N,Ω,c) ∈ Z(N,Ω) such that, for each i ∈ N, and
l ∈ {1, . . . ,￿},
ϕCEAil (N,Ω,c) =min{cil,µl},
where µl > 0 is chosen so that ∑i∈Nmin{cil,µl} = Ωl . Clearly, if all claims are
above the per capita endowment, i.e., for each i ∈ N and l = 1, . . .￿, cil ≥ Ωln , then
ϕCEAi (N,Ω,c) =
Ω
n
.
The constrained equal losses mechanism ϕCEL, which is somewhat polar to
the previous one, maps each problem (N,Ω,c)∈C into the allocation ϕCEL(N,Ω,c)∈
Z(N,Ω) such that, for each i ∈ N, and l ∈ {1, . . . ,￿},
ϕCELil (N,Ω,c) =max{0,cil−λl},
where λl > 0 is chosen so that ∑i∈Nmax{0,cil −λl} = Ωl . Clearly, if all claims
are above the per capita loss, i.e., for each i ∈ N and l = 1, . . .￿, cil ≥ ∑ j∈N c jl−Ωln ,
then
ϕCELi (N,Ω,c)≡ ci−
Ω−∑ j∈N c j
n
. (2.1)
In particular, as we shall show later, in the two-agent case, where the problem
can be depicted in an Edgeworth box, if both claims are below the endowment,
then ϕCEL selects the midpoint of the segment joining both claims vectors in the
Edgeworth box.
18Note that there is also an implicit (lower) bound condition in the range of the assignment
mechanism, which precludes agents from obtaining negative amounts.
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The proportional mechanism ϕPRO maps each problem (N,Ω,c) ∈ C into the
allocation ϕPRO(N,Ω,c) ∈ Z(N,Ω) such that, for each i ∈ N, and l ∈ {1, . . . ,￿},
ϕPROil (N,Ω,c) =
Ωl
∑ j∈N c jl
cil.
We now present a list of axioms for assignment mechanisms. The first ax-
iom says that when there is more to be divided, other things being equal, nobody
should lose.19 Formally,
Resource Monotonicity. For each (N,c,Ω) ∈ C (N) and Ω￿ ≥Ω,
ϕ(N,c,Ω￿)≥ ϕ(N,c,Ω).
An implication of resource monotonicity is that when the social endowment of a
certain good does not change, ceteris paribus, the allocation of that good should
remain unaffected by resource increases in other goods.
A widely applied principle, known as consistency, in the axiomatic literature
(see, e.g., Thomson (2007, 2012) and the literature cited therein) relates the allo-
cation by a rule for a given problem to the solutions of the subproblems that a sub-
group of agents face with the total amount they received at the original problem. It
requires that the application of the rule to each subproblem produces precisely the
allocation that the subgroup obtained in the original problem. That is, the original
resolution should be reinforced with the reassessment by any subgroup. Here we
consider two weaker principles, proposed by Thomson (2006), pertaining to the
exclusion of either agents with zero awards or agents with full awards.
The agents who receive zero in a given dimension of the original problem have
nothing to contribute in the ensuing subproblem. Thus, they may not be of interest
to other agents in the process of reassessment of the original resolution. The next
axiom requires that reassessment after excluding such agents should not alter how
much others get.
Zero-Award-Out-Consistency.20 For each (N,Ω,c) ∈ C (N), M ⊂ N, and
l ∈ {1, . . . ,￿}, if ϕil(N,c,Ω) = 0, for each i ∈M, then, for each j ∈ N\M,
ϕ jl(N\M,cN\M, ∑
k∈N\M
ϕk(N,c,Ω)) = ϕ jl(N,c,Ω).
19This axiom reflects a solidarity principle whose formalization in axiomatic work can be traced
back to Roemer (1986).
20In the bankruptcy model (￿ = 1), the same axiom is called “null compensations consistency”
by Thomson (2006).
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Similarly, the agents whose claims were fully respected will not be interested
in any further reassessment. The next axiom requires that dismissing a person
fully awarded should not affect how much others get.
Full-Award-Out-Consistency.21 For each (N,Ω,c) ∈ C (N), M ⊂ N, and l ∈
{1, . . . ,￿}, if ϕil(N,c,Ω) = cil , for each i ∈M, then, for each j ∈ N\M,
ϕ jl(N\M,cN\M, ∑
k∈N\M
ϕk(N,c,Ω)) = ϕ jl(N,c,Ω).
2.2 Exchange
An exchange rule, F : E¯ → Z, associates with each exchange economy
e ≡ (N,Ω,ω,R) ∈ E¯ a non-empty set of feasible allocations, F(e) ⊆ Z(N,Ω).
Exchange rules are studied extensively in the literature. The best known one is the
Walrasian (exchange) rule, FW , which associates with each exchange economy
e = (N,ω,R) the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations. Formally, for each
vector of market prices p ∈ R￿+, define the individual budget, delineated by the
initial endowment ωi, as B(ωi, p) = {zi ∈ R￿+ : p · zi ≤ p ·ωi}. An allocation z is
a Walrasian equilibrium allocation if there exists p ∈ R￿+ such that for each i ∈ N
and each z￿i ∈ B(ωi, p), zi ∈ B(ωi, p) and zi Ri z￿i. We shall also consider other rules
that are not Walrasian, yet satisfy the following basic condition for “voluntary”
exchange:
Individual Rationality. For each (N,ω,R) ∈ E¯ , z ∈ F(N,ω,R), and i ∈ N,
zi Riωi.
The composition of an assignment mechanism ϕ and an exchange rule F gives
rise to a social choice rule S(·)≡ F ◦ϕ(·) such that, for each e≡ (N,Ω,c,R) ∈ E ,
S(e)≡ F ◦ϕ(e) = F(N,ϕ(N,Ω,c),R).
We shall be mostly interested in social choice rules arising from the composition
of an assignment mechanism and the Walrasian rule, or other individually rational
exchange rules.
21In the bankruptcy model (￿ = 1), the same axiom is called “full compensations consistency”
by Thomson (2006).
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2.3 End-state fairness
We now move to some classical fairness axioms of social choice rules. One of
the fundamental notions in the theory of fair allocation is envy-freeness, which
although can be traced back to Foley (1967), was not formally introduced till
Kolm (1972) and Pazner and Schmeidler (1974, 1978).22 It is widely accepted
that such a notion represents an adequate test of fairness (e.g., Fleurbaey and
Maniquet, 2011; Thomson, 2011). An allocation satisfies no-envy, or is said to
be envy-free, if there is no pair of agents in which one prefers the allocation of the
other. Formally,
No-Envy. For each e≡ (N,Ω,c,R) ∈ E and z ∈ S (e), there is no pair i, j ∈ N
such that z j Pi zi.
The above notion does not make use of any information on claims to establish
envy comparisons. The following ones fill that gap. Given an allocation z ∈ Z and
an agent i∈N, call ci−zi the sacrifice agent imakes at z.23 An allocation satisfies
sacrifice-no-envy, or is said to be sacrifice-envy-free, if no agent prefers making
the sacrifice of anyone else to making his own sacrifice. Note that, as imposing
the sacrifice of another agent might generate negative consumption at some di-
mensions, and preferences are only defined for non-negative consumptions, we
consider truncated bundles to perform these comparisons in terms of sacrifices.
Formally,
Sacrifice-No-Envy. For each e ≡ (N,Ω,c,R) ∈ E and z ∈ S (e), there is no
pair, i, j ∈ N, such that ￿ci− ￿c j− z j￿￿+ Pi zi.
This notion is similar to fair net trades (e.g., Schmeidler and Vind, 1972) for
exchange economies. Given an allocation z, the net trade of agent i with endow-
ment ωi is the vector zi−ωi. A net trade is said to be fair if, for any agent i, his
net trade is at least as good for him as the net trade of any other agent.
Now, instead of measuring sacrifices in absolute terms, we could also measure
them in relative terms. Formally, given an allocation z ∈ Z and an agent i ∈ N, let
ci/zi ≡ (ci1/zi1, . . . ,cil/zil) be the relative sacrifice agent imakes at z, whenever it
is well-defined, including the case when cil > 0 and cil/zil = cil/0≡ ∞.24 A dual
22See also Varian (1974).
23Velez and Thomson (2012) have recently used the same word to describe a different, but
somewhat related, notion in the “classical” problem of fair allocation (without claims). More
precisely, they measure an agent’s “sacrifice” at an allocation by the size of the set of feasible
bundles that the agent prefers to her consumption.
24The relative sacrifice is not well-defined in the case that, for some l, cil = 0 and zil = 0.
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concept is relative compensation zi/ci ≡ (zi1/ci1, . . . ,ci￿/zi￿). Interpersonal com-
parison of relative-sacrifice or relative-compensation will provide the same notion
of no-envy. Here we consider relative-compensation. When zil = 0= cil , relative
compensation is not well-defined. In this case, we will adopt the convention that
when zil = 0 = cil , i is considered to be getting zero relative compensation with
regard to good l.25 We say that allocation z satisfies relative-no-envy, or is said to
be relative-envy-free, at economy (N,Ω,c,R) ∈ E , if no agent prefers the relative
compensation of anyone else to his own; that is, there do not exist i, j ∈ N such
that ci× (z j/c j)Pi zi, where the product × is to be defined as the coordinate-wise
multiplication.26 Then this axiom can be stated as follows.
Relative-No-Envy. For each e ≡ (N,Ω,c,R) ∈ E , and z ∈ S (e), there is no
pair, i, j ∈ N, such that ci× (z j/c j)Pi zi, where for all l, the l-th component of
z j/c j equals zero when z jl = c jl = 0.
3 The results
As we show in this section, using the three notions of fairness in Section 2.3, we
provide axiomatic characterizations of the three central assignment mechanisms,
the constrained equal awards mechanism, the constrained equal losses mechanism
and the proportional mechanism.
3.1 No-envy and the constrained equal awards mechanism
A trivial way of guaranteeing no-envy is to divide equally. For each (N,Ω,c)∈C ,
let ωed(N,Ω,c) be the equal division allocation in which each agent i receives
Ω/n. We sometimes denote ωed(N,Ω,c) by ωed(N,Ω). Note that ωed(N,Ω,c)
may not necessarily satisfy claims-boundedness. In particular, when claims are
distributed very unequally (one agent with extremely large claims and another
with small claims), claims-boundedness restricts the choice of initial endowments
which are so unequal that any individual rational exchange from these endow-
ments will make the poor agent (the one with small claims) envy the rich agent
(the one with extremely large claims). Therefore, for these economies, no-envy
25If we do not follow this convention, the results we show in Section 3.3 may be more compli-
cated and we may need an additional consistency axiom (null-consistency) to get a similar result
to the main result we provide therein.
26In other words, if x= (x1, . . . ,x￿),y= (y1, . . . ,y￿) ∈ R￿+, then x× y= (x1y1, . . . ,x￿y￿).
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is too strong a requirement to satisfy. Thus, we will require no-envy only for the
economies with somewhat even distribution of claims across agents.
Let E 0 ≡ {(N,Ω,c,R) ∈ E : 0 ≤ ωed(N,Ω) ≤ c} be the set of economies
where equal division satisfies claims-boundedness. Let C 0 ≡ {(N,Ω,c)∈C : 0≤
ωed(N,Ω) ≤ c} be the set of the corresponding claims problems. There are in-
finitely many envy-free and efficient allocations at typical economies in E 0. Thus,
there are infinitely many selections from such allocations, namely social choice
rules satisfying efficiency and no-envy on E 0. Nevertheless, when one focuses
on the social choice rules that are represented by a combination of an assignment
mechanism and an individually rational exchange rule, all but one social choice
rules are ruled out, as we show in this section. In order to do that, we need first
some preliminary results.
Lemma 1. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality. Let ϕ be
an assignment mechanism that, when combined with F, generates a social choice
rule satisfying no-envy. Then, for each (N,Ω,c) ∈ C , ϕ(N,Ω,c) = ωed(N,Ω,c).
Proof. Let F be an individually rational exchange rule and ϕ be an assignment
mechanism that, when combined with F , generates a social choice rule satisfying
no-envy. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists (N,Ω,c) ∈ C such that ω ≡
ϕ(N,Ω,c) ￿= ωed(N,Ω,c). Then, as ∑k∈Nωk = Ω, there exist i, j ∈ N, and p ∈
R￿++ such that p ·ωi < p · Ωn < p ·ω j. Let e = (N,Ω,ω,R) ∈ E be such that
Ri is represented by Ui(x) ≡ p · x, Rh is strictly convex for some h ∈ N, and ω is
Pareto efficient at R. Then ω is the only feasible allocation that satisfies individual
rationality.27 Hence, ω = F(N,ω,R). As p ·ω j > p ·ωi, agent i prefers j’s bundle
to his own, contradicting no-envy.
Proposition 1. The claims domain C 0 is the maximal domain on which an assign-
ment mechanism and an individually rational exchange rule combined together
can generate envy-free allocations. Moreover, on this maximal claims domain,
individual rationality, no-envy, and efficiency are compatible.
Proof. Let (N,Ω,c) ∈ C \C 0. Let ϕ be an assignment mechanism and F an in-
dividually rational exchange rule such that, when combined together, can gen-
erate envy-free allocations. Then, by Lemma 1, ϕ(N,Ω,c) = ωed(N,Ω,c) but
as (N,Ω,c) /∈ C 0, this would contradict the claims boundedness assumption of
assignment mechanisms.
27This is because if there is any other individually rational allocation z, a convex combination
of z and ω will be a Pareto improvement of ω , contradicting Pareto efficiency of ω .
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On the other hand, using the constrained equal awards mechanism and the
Walrasian exchange rule, the second statement follows from the First Fundamen-
tal Theorem of Welfare Economics, which states that all Walrasian equilibrium
allocations are efficient.
Proposition 2. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality. If
an assignment mechanism ϕ satisfies resource monotonicity and, when combined
with F, leads to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E 0, then, ϕ(N,Ω,c) =
ϕCEA(N,Ω,c), for each (N,Ω,c) ∈ C , with |N|= 2.
Proof. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality, and ϕ an as-
signment mechanism satisfying resource monotonicity such that, when combined
with F , leads to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E 0. Furthermore, let
(N,Ω,c) ∈ C , with |N| = 2. Without loss of generality, assume that N ≡ {1,2}.
For each l = 0, . . . ,￿, let C (N, l)≡ {(N,Ω,c)∈C (N) : ∀k≥ l+1,∀i∈N,Ωk/2≤
cik}. Then, C (N,0) ≡ C 0(N), and C (N,￿) = C (N). We show that ϕ coincides
with ϕCEA on C (N,k) for each k = 0,1, . . . ,￿, using mathematical induction.
By Lemma 1, ϕ coincides with ϕCEA on C (N,0). Let l ∈ {1, . . . ,￿}, Suppose,
by induction, that ϕ coincides with ϕCEA on C (N,k) for each k ≤ l−1. We now
prove that ϕ coincides with ϕCEA on C (N, l).
Let (N,Ω,c) ∈ C (N, l)\C (N, l − 1). Then c1l < Ωl/2 ≤ c2l and, for each
k ≥ l+ 1 and all i ∈ N, Ωk/2 ≤ cik.28 Thus, ϕCEAl (N,c,Ω) = (c1l,Ωl− c1l). Let
ω ≡ ϕ(N,Ω,c). Let Ω￿ be such that Ω￿l ≡ 2c1l and for each k ￿= l, Ω￿k ≡Ωk. Then
(N,c,Ω￿) ∈ C (N, l−1) and, by the induction hypothesis,
ϕ(N,Ω￿,c) = ϕCEA(N,Ω￿,c). (3.1)
In particular, ϕl(N,Ω￿,c) = (Ω￿l/2,Ω￿l/2) = (c1l,c1l). As Ω￿ ≤ Ω, then, by re-
source monotonicity,ω =ϕ(N,Ω,c)≥ϕ(N,Ω￿,c). By claims-boundedness,ω1l =
c1l . Then ω2l = Ωl − c1l . Therefore, ϕl(N,Ω,c) = ϕCEAl (N,Ω,c). As Ω￿k =
Ωk for each k ￿= l, then applying resource monotonicity to both ϕ and ϕCEA,
ϕk(N,Ω￿,c) = ϕk(N,Ω,c) and ϕCEAk (N,Ω
￿,c) = ϕCEAk (N,Ω,c). Hence, using
(3.1), for each k ￿= l, we conclude the proof.
When the assignment mechanism satisfies an additional consistency axiom,
this result for two-person economies can be extended to general economies as
stated next in the main result of this section.
28We have assumed, for ease of exposition, that c1l ≤ c2l .
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Theorem 1. An assignment mechanism satisfies resource monotonicity and full-
award-out-consistency and, when combined with an individually rational exchange
rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E 0 if and only if it is the
constrained equal awards mechanism.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that the constrained equal awards mechanism
satisfies resource monotonicity and full-award-out-consistency and, when com-
bined with an individually rational exchange rule (e.g., the Walrasian rule), leads
to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E 0. We focus on the converse impli-
cation, which we prove for the case ￿ = 1.29 Let ϕ be an assignment mechanism
satisfying resource monotonicity and full-award-out-consistency that, when com-
bined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule
satisfying no-envy on E 0. By Lemma 1, we only have to show that, for each
(N,Ω,c) ∈ C \C 0, ϕ(N,Ω,c) = ϕCEA(N,Ω,c). The proof is by induction. More
precisely, let (N,Ω,c) ∈ C \C 0. For ease of exposition, and without loss of gen-
erality, we assume that N = {1, . . . ,n} and that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · ·≤ cn. Now, for each
m ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n} let30
C m(N) = {(N,Ω,c) ∈ C :
m−1
∑
i=1
ci+(n−m+1)cm <Ω≤
m
∑
i=1
ci+(n−m)cm+1}.
It is straightforward to see that C (N)\C 0(N) =￿nm=1C m(N). We now show, by
induction, that, for eachm∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, and each (N,Ω,c)∈C m(N), ϕ(N,Ω,c)
= ϕCEA(N,Ω,c).
Case m = 1. Let (N,Ω,c) ∈ C 1(N). Then, ϕCEA(N,Ω,c) = (c1,λ , . . . ,λ ),
where λ =(Ω−c1)/(n−1). LetΩ￿ ≡ nc1. Then (N,Ω￿,c)∈C 0 and, by Lemma 1,
ϕ(N,Ω￿,c) = (c1,c1, . . . ,c1) = ϕCEA(N,Ω￿,c). By resource monotonicity,
ϕ1(N,Ω,c)≥ c1. Thus, by claims-boundedness, ϕ1(N,Ω,c) = c1.
Now, as (N\{1},c−1,Ω− c1) ∈ C 0, it follows, by Lemma 1, that
ϕ(N\{1},c−1,Ω− c1) = ϕCEA(N\{1},c−1,Ω− c1) =
￿
Ω− c1
n−1 , . . . ,
Ω− c1
n−1
￿
.
(3.2)
By full-award-out-consistency,
ϕN\{1}(N,Ω,c) = ϕ(N\{1},c−1,Ω− c1);
ϕCEAN\{1}(N,Ω,c) = ϕ
CEA(N\{1},c−1,Ω− c1). (3.3)
29The general proof uses an induction argument similar to the one in the proof of Proposition 2
and is provided in the appendix.
30We also use the notational convention ∑0i=1 ci = 0.
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Combining (3.2) and (3.3), ϕN\{1}(N,c,Ω) = ϕCEAN\{1}(N,c,Ω), which completes
the proof of this case.
Case m→m+1. Suppose then that, for eachm∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}, ϕ(N,c,Ω)=
ϕCEA(N,c,Ω), for each (N,c,Ω) ∈ C m(N). Let (N,c,Ω) ∈ C m+1(N). We aim to
show that ϕ(N,c,Ω) = ϕCEA(N,c,Ω)= (c1, . . . ,cm−1,λ , . . . ,λ ), where
λ = [Ω−∑m−1k=1 ck]/(n−m+ 1). Let Ω￿ ≡ ∑m−1k=1 ck + (n−m+ 1)cm−1. Then,
(N,c,Ω￿) ∈ C m(N), and, by the induction hypothesis, we obtain that
ϕ(N,c,Ω￿) =(c1, . . . ,cm−1,λ ￿, . . . ,λ ￿), where λ ￿ = [Ω￿ −∑m−1k=1 ck]/(n−m+ 1).
Thus, in particular, ϕk(N,c,Ω￿) = ck, for each k ≤ m− 1. Then, by resource
monotonicity and claims boundedness, ϕk(N,c,Ω) = ck, for each k ≤ m− 1. On
the other hand, by full-award-out-consistency,
ϕN\{1,...,m−1}(N,c,Ω) = ϕ({m, . . . ,n},(cm, . . . ,cn),Ω−
m−1
∑
k=1
ck). (3.4)
As ({m, . . . ,n},(cm, . . . ,cn),Ω−∑m−1k=1 ck) ∈ C 0, it follows, by Lemma 1, that
ϕ({m, . . . ,n},(cm, . . . ,cn),Ω−
m−1
∑
k=1
ck) = (λ , . . . ,λ ). (3.5)
Therefore, by (3.4) and (3.5), ϕN\{1,...,m−1}(N,c,Ω) = (λ , . . . ,λ ), which com-
pletes the proof.
Remark 1. Full-award-out-consistency can be strengthened in the statement of
the theorem to consistency. In this case, the “only if” part can be proven using
Proposition 2 and the so-called Elevator Lemma (e.g., Thomson, 2007).
3.2 Sacrifice-no-envy and the constrained equal losses mecha-
nism
A trivial way of guaranteeing sacrifice-no-envy is to allocate equally the total
loss or sacrifice ∑i∈N ci−Ω the society has to bear. For each (N,Ω,c) ∈ C , let
es(N,Ω,c)≡ (∑i∈N ci−Ω)/n be the equal sacrifice at (N,Ω,c). Letωes(N,Ω,c)≡
(ci− es(N,Ω,c))i∈N be the equal sacrifice allocation. Note that ωes(N,Ω,c) may
contain some negative consumptions, in which case it is not a well-defined al-
location. In particular, when agents have quite disparate claims (an agent with
extremely large claims, even larger than Ω, and the others with extremely small
claims), it may not be possible to satisfy sacrifice-no-envy at all. Thus, we first
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restrict our attention to less extreme cases where equal sacrifice is feasible. For-
mally, let C ∗ ≡ {(N,Ω,c) ∈ C : ωes(N,Ω,c) ∈ Z(N,Ω)} and
E ∗ ≡ {e= (N,Ω,c,R) ∈ E : (N,Ω,c) ∈ C ∗}. It is not difficult to show that there
are infinite social choice rules that satisfy efficiency and sacrifice-no-envy, when
restricted to E ∗. This can be demonstrated by the infinite cardinality of the set of
sacrifice-envy-free and efficient allocations at typical economies in E ∗. However,
when one focuses on the type of social choice rules that are a combination of an
assignment mechanism and an individually rational exchange rule, all but one so-
cial choice rules are ruled out, as we show in this section. In order to do that, we
need first some preliminary results.
Lemma 2. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality. Let ϕ be
an assignment mechanism that, when combined with F, generates a social choice
rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy. Then, for each (N,Ω,c) ∈ C , ϕ(N,Ω,c) =
ωes(N,Ω,c).
Proof. Let F be an individually rational exchange rule and ϕ be an assignment
mechanism that, when combined with F , generates a social choice rule satisfying
sacrifice-no-envy. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists (N,Ω,c) ∈ C such
that ω ≡ ϕ(N,Ω,c) ￿= ωes(N,Ω,c). Then, as ∑k∈Nωk = Ω = ∑k∈Nωesk , there
exist i, j ∈ N and p ∈ R￿++, such that p ·ωesi > p ·ωi and p ·ωesj < p ·ω j. Thus,
p ·ωi < p ·ωesi < p · [ci+(ω j− c j)]+.31 Let e = (N,Ω,ω,R) be such that Ri is
represented by Ui(x) ≡ p · x, Rj is strictly convex, and ω is Pareto efficient at R.
Then, ω is the only feasible allocation that satisfies individual rationality. Hence,
ω = F(N,ω,R). As p ·ωi < p · [ci + (ω j − c j)]+, agent i envies j’s sacrifice,
contradicting sacrifice-no-envy.
Proposition 3. The claims domain C ∗ is the maximal domain on which an assign-
ment mechanism and an individually rational exchange rule combined together
can generate sacrifice-envy-free allocations. Moreover, on this maximal claims
domain, individual rationality, sacrifice-no-envy, and efficiency are compatible.
Proof. Let (N,Ω,c) ∈ C \C ∗. Let ϕ be an assignment mechanism and F an indi-
vidually rational exchange rule, such that, when combined together, can generate
sacrifice-envy-free allocations. Then, by Lemma 2, ϕ(N,Ω,c) = ωes(N,Ω,c) but
as (N,Ω,c) /∈ C ∗, this contradicts the non-negativity condition in the definition of
assignment mechanisms.
31More precisely, p · ωesj < p · ω j implies that p · (ω j − c j) > p · (Ω −
∑i∈N ci)/n and, therefore, p · [ci+(ω j− c j)]+ ￿ p · (ci+(ω j− c j))> p ·ωesi > p ·ωi.
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On the other hand, using the constrained equal losses mechanism and the Wal-
rasian exchange rule, the second statement follows from the First Fundamental
Theorem of Welfare Economics.
Proposition 4. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality. If
an assignment mechanism ϕ satisfies resource monotonicity and, when combined
with F, leads to a social choice rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on E ∗, then,
ϕ(N,Ω,c) = ϕCEL(N,Ω,c), for each (N,Ω,c) ∈ C , with |N|= 2.
Proof. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality, and ϕ an as-
signment mechanism satisfying resource monotonicity such that, when combined
with F , leads to a social choice rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on E ∗. Further-
more, let (N,Ω,c) ∈ C , with |N| = 2. Without loss of generality, assume that
N ≡ {1,2}.
For each l = 0, . . . ,￿, let C ∗(N, l) ≡ {(N,Ω,c) ∈ C (N) : ∀k ≥ l + 1,∀i ∈
N, (∑ j∈N c jk−Ωk)/2 ≤ cik}. Then, C ∗(N,0) ≡ C ∗(N), and C ∗(N,￿) = C (N).
We show that ϕ coincides with ϕCEL on C (N,k) for each k = 0,1, . . . ,￿, using
mathematical induction.
By Lemma 2, ϕ coincides with ϕCEL on C ∗(N,0). Let l ∈ {1, . . . ,￿}, Suppose,
by induction, that ϕ coincides with ϕCEL on C ∗(N,k) for each k≤ l−1. We now
prove that ϕ coincides with ϕCEL on C ∗(N, l).
Let (N,Ω,c) ∈ C ∗(N, l)\C ∗(N, l − 1) be such that c1l ≤ c2l . Then,
ϕCELl (N,Ω,c)= (0,Ωl)≤ (0,c2l − c1l). Let Ω￿l ≡ c2l − c1l and, for each k ￿= l,
Ω￿k =Ωk. Then (N,Ω￿,c) ∈ C ∗(N, l−1) and, by the induction hypothesis,
ϕ(N,Ω￿,c) = ϕCEL(N,Ω￿,c). (3.6)
In particular, ϕCELl (N,c,Ω
￿)= (0,c2l − c1l)= ϕl(N,c,Ω￿). By resource mono-
tonicity and non-negativity, ϕ1l(N,c,Ω) = 0 and so ϕl(N,c,Ω) = (0,Ωl) =
ϕCELl (N,c,Ω).
AsΩ￿k =Ωk for each k ￿= l, then applying resource monotonicity to both ϕ and
ϕCEL, we have ϕk(N,c,Ω) = ϕk(N,c,Ω￿) and ϕCELk (N,c,Ω
￿) = ϕCELk (N,c,Ω).
Hence, using (3.6), for each k ￿= l, we conclude the proof.
This result for two-agent economies can be extended to all economies with
more than two agents, when a consistency axiom is added as stated next in the
main result of this section.
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Theorem 2. An assignment mechanism satisfies resource monotonicity and zero-
award-out-consistency, and, when combined with an individually rational ex-
change rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on E ∗ if
and only if it is the constrained equal losses mechanism.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that the constrained equal losses mechanism
satisfies resource monotonicity and zero-award-out-consistency and, when com-
bined with an individually rational exchange rule (e.g., the Walrasian rule), leads
to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E ∗. We focus on the converse im-
plication, which we prove for the case ￿ = 1.32 Let ϕ be an assignment mecha-
nism satisfying resource monotonicity and zero-award-out-consistency that, when
combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule
satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on E ∗. By Lemma 2, we only have to show that, for
each (N,c,Ω) ∈ C \C ∗, ϕ(N,c,Ω) = ϕCEL(N,c,Ω). The proof is by induction.
More precisely, let (N,c,Ω) ∈ C \C ∗. For ease of exposition, and without loss of
generality, we assume that N = {1, . . . ,n} and that c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn. Now, for
each m ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}, let
Cm(N) = {(N,c,Ω) ∈ C :
n
∑
i=m+1
ci− (n−m)cm+1 ≤Ω<
n
∑
i=m
ci− (n−m+1)cm}.
It is straightforward to see that C (N)\C ∗(N) = ￿n−1m=1Cm(N). We now show, by
induction, that, for each m ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n− 1}, ϕ(N,c,Ω) = ϕCEL(N,c,Ω), for
each (N,c,Ω) ∈ Cm(N).
Case m= 1. Let (N,c,Ω)∈C1(N). Then, ϕCEL(N,c,Ω) = (0,c1−λ , . . . ,cn−
λ ), where λ =(∑ni=2 ci−Ω)/(n−1). LetΩ￿ ≡∑i∈N ci−nc1. Note that (N,Ω￿,c)∈
C ∗ and
ϕCEL(N,Ω￿,c) =
￿
ci−
∑nj=1 c j−Ω￿
n
￿
i∈N
= (0,c2− c1,c3− c1, . . . ,cn− c1).
Then, by Lemma 2, ϕ(N,Ω￿,c) = ϕCEL(N,Ω￿,c) and, in particular, ϕ1(N,Ω￿,c) =
0. By resource monotonicity, and non-negativity, ϕ1(N,Ω,c) = 0. By zero-award-
out-consistency,
ϕ(N\{1}, ∑
j∈N\{1}
ϕ j(N,Ω,c),c−1) = ϕ(N\{1},Ω,c−1)
= ϕN\{1}(N,Ω,c).
32The general proof is provided in the appendix.
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As (N\{1},Ω,c−1) ∈ C ∗, then, by Lemma 2,
ϕ(N\{1},Ω,c−1) = ϕCEL(N\{1},Ω,c−1) =
￿
ci−
∑nj=2 c j−Ω
n−1
￿
i∈N\{1}
.
Therefore, ϕ(N,Ω,c) = ϕCEL(N,Ω,c).
Case m→m+1. Suppose then that, for eachm∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−2}, ϕ(N,c,Ω)=
ϕCEL(N,c,Ω), for each (N,c,Ω) ∈ Cm(N). Let (N,c,Ω) ∈ Cm+1(N). We aim to
show that ϕ(N,c,Ω) = ϕCEL(N,c,Ω) = (0, . . . ,0,cm+2− λ , . . . ,cn− λ ), where
λ = ∑
n
i=m+2 ci−Ω
n−m−1 . Let t > 0 be such that cm+1 =
∑ni=m+1 ci−(Ω+t)
n−m . Let Ω
￿ ≡ Ω+
t and λ ￿ ≡ ∑ni=m+1 ci−(Ω+t)n−m . Then, by the induction hypothesis, ϕ(N,Ω￿,c) =
ϕCEL(N,Ω￿,c) = (0, . . . ,0,cm+1−λ ￿, . . . ,cn−λ ￿). In particular, ϕi(N,Ω￿,c) = 0,
for each i≤m+1. By resource monotonicity, and non-negativity, ϕi(N,Ω,c) = 0,
for each i≤ m+1. Let N￿ ≡ {m+2, . . . ,n}. By zero-award-out-consistency,
ϕ(N￿,Ω,cN￿) = ϕN￿(N,Ω,c).
As (N￿,Ω,cN￿) ∈ C ∗, then, by Lemma 2,
ϕ(N￿,Ω,cN￿) = ϕCEL(N￿,Ω,cN￿) = ϕCELN￿ (N,Ω,c).
Therefore, ϕ(N,Ω,c) = ϕCEL(N,Ω,c).
Remark 2. Zero-award-out-consistency can be strengthened in the statement of
the theorem to consistency. In this case, the “only if” part can be proven using
Proposition 4 and the so-called Elevator Lemma (e.g., Thomson, 2007).
3.3 Relative-no-envy and the proportional mechanism
We explore in this section the implications of relative-no-envy. In contrast with
the previous two sections, one can find an assignment mechanism that, when com-
bined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule
satisfying relative-no-envy on the “whole” domain. A simple example, among
others, is the combination of proportional mechanism and the no-trade exchange
rule.
Thus, the maximal claims domain on which an assignment mechanism and
an individually rational exchange rule combined together can generate relative-
envy-free allocations is the universal claims domain. This is in contrast with the
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counterpart results for no-envy (Proposition 1) and sacrifice-no-envy (Proposi-
tion 3).
The next result shows that if any other assignment mechanism, different from
the proportional one is used, relative-envy is inevitable.
Lemma 3. Let F be an exchange rule satisfying individual rationality. Let ϕ
be an assignment mechanism that, when combined with F, generates a social
choice rule satisfying relative-no-envy. Then, for each (N,Ω,c)∈C , ϕ(N,Ω,c) =
ϕ pro(N,Ω,c).
Let F be an individually rational exchange rule and ϕ be an assignment mech-
anism that, when combined with F , generates a social choice rule satisfying
relative-no-envy. Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists (N,Ω,c) ∈ C such
that ω ≡ ϕ(N,Ω,c) ￿= ϕ pro(N,Ω,c). Thus, there exist i, j ∈ N, and lˆ ∈ {1, . . . ,￿},
such that ωilˆ > Ωlˆ ·
cilˆ
∑h∈N chlˆ
and ω jlˆ < Ωlˆ ·
c jlˆ
∑h∈N chlˆ
. Then cilˆ > 0, as otherwise
the first inequality contradicts claims boundedness. Likewise, c jlˆ > 0, as other-
wise the second inequality contradicts non-negativity. Hence ωilˆcilˆ >
ω jlˆ
c jlˆ
. Then,
there exists a vector of prices p ∈ R￿++ such that p · (c j × ωici ) > p ·ω j. Let
e= (N,Ω,c,R) ∈ E , where R is such that Ri is represented byUi(x)≡ p · x, Rh is
strictly convex for some h ∈ N, and ω is Pareto efficient at R. Then, ω is the only
feasible allocation that satisfies individual rationality. Hence, ω = F(N,ω,R).
Now, as p · c j× ωici > p ·ω j, agent j envies i’s relative sacrifice, which proves the
statement of the lemma.
As explained earlier, on the whole claims domain, individual rationality and
relative-no-envy can be met when the proportional mechanism is used. This
lemma shows that it is the only such mechanism. However, as stated in the next
proposition, relative-no-envy and efficiency are incompatible, which is also in
contrast with the corresponding results for no-envy (Proposition 1) and sacrifice-
no-envy (Proposition 3) presented above.
Proposition 5. On the universal claims domain, there exist an assignment mech-
anism and an individually rational exchange rule such that, when combined to-
gether, can generate relative-envy-free allocations. However, relative-no-envy and
efficiency are incompatible.33
33It is worth mentioning that the counter example we use for the proof, is set in an exchange
economy. Thus, the incompatibility remains valid in the standard model of exchange economies.
23
Proof. The first statement follows from the discussion preceding the previous
proposition. To show the second statement, consider an exchange economy with
two agents and two goods. Let c1 ≡ (200/3,100/3) and c2 ≡ (100/3,200/3). Let
Ω ≡ (100,100). Preferences of agents 1 and 2 are represented, respectively, by
u1(x1,x2)≡ αx1+x2 and u2(x1,x2)≡ βx1+x2, with 1/2< α < β < 2. Then, the
set of efficient allocations is {((0,x2),(100,100 − x2)) : x2 ∈ [0,100]} ∪
{((x1,100),(100− x1,0)) : x1 ∈ [0,100]}. We show that no efficient allocation
in this economy satisfies relative-no-envy. First, consider the efficient allocations
((0,x2),(100,100− x2)) with x2 ∈ [0,100]. for each x2 ∈ [0,100], all these effi-
cient allocations fail relative-no-envy due to agent 1’s envy. If agent 1 makes the
relative sacrifice of agent 2, her consumption becomes (2× 100,(100− x2)/2).
As α > 1/2, then (400α + 100)/3 > 100. This implies x2 < 200α + 50− x2/2,
which means u1(0,x2) < u1(2× 100,(100− x2)/2), i.e., agent 1 prefers making
the relative sacrifice of agent 2 to making his own. In the case of efficient al-
locations ((x1,100),(100− x1,0)) with x1 ∈ [0,100], using β < 2 and the same
argument as above for agent 2, we can show that they fail relative-no-envy due to
agent 2’s envy.
Now we are ready to state the third characterization result.
Theorem 3. An assignment mechanism, when combined with an individually ra-
tional exchange rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying relative-no-envy if
and only if it is the proportional mechanism.
Proof. It is straightforward to see that the proportional mechanism, when com-
bined with the no-trade exchange rule (which is, trivially, individually rational)
guarantees relative-no-envy.34 As for the converse implication, let ϕ be an as-
signment mechanism such that, when combined with an individually rational ex-
change rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying relative-no-envy. By Lemma 3,
ϕ must be the proportional mechanism.
In contrast with the results from the previous sections involving other notions
of no-envy, the Walrasian rule cannot be used here as equilibrium allocations may
violate relative-no-envy. In the case of no-envy, the Walrasian budget set from
the equal division provides equal opportunities of consumption for each agent,
which guarantees no-envy at equilibrium allocations. Likewise, the Walrasian
34Apart from the no-trade rule, there are many other individually rational exchange rules that
always select allocations satisfying relative-no-envy (as well as efficiency, whenever relative-no-
envy and efficiency are compatible).
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budget set provides equal opportunities of trades for each agent. Thus, when the
initial endowment is chosen at the allocation with equal sacrifice, all equilibrium
allocations necessarily satisfy sacrifice-no-envy. However, the Walrasian budget
set does not provide equal opportunities of “relative trades”, i.e., the ratio of the
final consumption and the initial endowment across consumers.
Ratio-no-envy and proportional Walrasian equilibrium
An alternative method of measuring the “rates” of sacrifices, or rewards, is to use
a price vector that reflects “subjective” marginal rate of substitutions between any
two goods. We next introduce the corresponding axiom of no-envy. In contrast
with relative-no-envy, it is compatible with efficiency, as we explain later.
Let z be a feasible allocation for an economy e≡ (N,Ω,c,R). For each i ∈ N,
denote a supporting normal vector of i’s indifference set at zi by pi, that is, for all
x with xRizi, pi · x≥ pi · zi. Then pi gives i’s marginal rate of substitution between
any two goods for agent i and may be called as i’s subjective valuation of goods.
Note that zipi·ci is the vector consisting of the amounts of each good l person i gets
for each unit value of her claim. Likewise, from i’s point of view, z jpi·c j is the
vector consisting of the amounts of each good l person j gets for each unit value
(measured by i’s price vector) of j’s claim. The comparative axiom of fairness
with regard to these vectors can be defined as follows.
Allocation z satisfies ratio-no-envy at e≡ (N,Ω,c,R) if, for each i ∈ N, there
is a supporting normal vector pi of i’s indifference curve at zi such that, for each
j ∈ N,
pi · ci× zipi · ci = zi Ri p
i · ci× z jpi · c j =
pi · ci
pi · c j × z j.
To show the existence of allocations satisfying ratio-no-envy and efficiency, an
extended notion of Walrasian equilibrium introduced by Peleg (1996) and Korthu-
es (2000) can be used.35 An allocation z is a proportional Walrasian equilibrium
if there is a price p such that for each i, i’s income wi(p,c,Ω) is given by
wi(p,c,Ω)≡ p · cip ·∑c j p ·Ω,
and z is a Walrasian equilibrium with equilibrium price p and the profile of indi-
vidual incomes (wi(p,c,Ω))i, that is, for each i, p · zi ≤ wi(p,c,Ω) and for each x
with p · x≤ wi(p,c,Ω), ziRix, and ∑i zi =Ω.
35They consider the framework where the total claims of each good may be more or less than
the total endowment; thus, all economies in our model are examples of theirs.
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Note that
wi(p,c,Ω)
wj(p,c,Ω)
=
p · ci
p · c j .
When z and p constitute a proportional Walrasian equilibrium, as the ratio of
wi(p,c,Ω) and wj(p,c,Ω) is the same as the ratio of p · ci and p · c j, we get
p ·
￿
pi · ci× z jpi · c j
￿
=
pi · ci
pi · c j × p · z j ≤
pi · ci
pi · c j ×wj(p,c,Ω) = wi(p,c,Ω).
This means that with i’s wealth wi(p,c,Ω), i can afford to obtain the consumption
bundle p
i·ci
pi·c j ×z j where, out of each unit of the value of her claim, she gets the same
amount of each good as j does at z j. As zi maximizes i’s preference satisfaction
over her budget set,
zi Ri pi · ci× z jpi · c j .
Thus, ratio-no-envy is satisfied. Existence of ratio-Walrasian equilibrium is shown
by Peleg (1996). Therefore, there exists an allocation satisfying both efficiency
and ratio-no-envy.
4 Concluding remarks
We have presented in this paper a general model of exchange economies to study
the allocation of disputed properties, while accommodating the three levels in
which fairness can be scrutinized in this context; namely, fairness in the initial
allocation of rights on disputed properties, fairness in the transaction of allocated
rights, and fairness of the end-state allocation. We have focused, in such context,
on the combination of assignment mechanisms (to assign each profile of conflict-
ing demands and supply an initial endowment) andWalrasian or other individually
rational market exchange. We have characterized two assignment mechanisms
that, when combined with Walrasian exchange, give rise to efficiency, as well as
two related forms of no envy. More precisely, we have shown that the compo-
sition of the constrained equal awards (losses) assignment mechanism with the
Walrasian exchange rule is essentially the only way to obtain (sacrifice-)envy-free
(and efficient) allocations via such a two-step process.36
36The composition of the proportional assignment mechanism with Walrasian exchange has
not been characterized in this paper, although we have seen how a suitable notion of envy free-
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The composition of the constrained equal awards mechanism with Walrasian
exchange, an example of the rules we characterize in Theorem 1, is akin to the
so-called Walrasian rule from equal division (or competitive equilibrium corre-
spondence from equal division) that has been singled out as a focal social choice
rule in the literature of fair allocation and distributive justice (e.g., Varian, 1974;
Dworkin, 1981; Yaari and Bar-Hillel, 1984; Roemer, 1996; Fleurbaey and Mani-
quet, 2011). When the equal division is within the claims-bound of all agents,
they coincide. In the model of classical exchange economies, the Walrasian equi-
librium from equal division has been axiomatized in several ways. In particular,
Yaari (1982) shows that it is the unique exchange rule that guarantees, not only no-
envy among individual consumers, but also “coalitional” no-envy (no-envy among
equal-sized coalitions),37 provided the number of agents is sufficiently large.38
The composition of the constrained equal losses assignment mechanism with
Walrasian exchange, an example of the rules we characterize in Theorem 2, does
not have a counterpart in the literature on fair allocation, as claims, which are col-
lectively not feasible, are the standard for making interpersonal fairness compar-
isons and for determining the initial endowment from which Walrasian exchange
takes place. Nevertheless, this rule and the end-state fairness concept (sacrifice-
no-envy) used for the characterization, resemble the Walrasian rule and the axiom
of fair net trade, or trade-no-envy, introduced by Schmeidler and Vind (1972)
in exchange economies. The Walrasian rule is shown to be the unique rule sat-
isfying “coalitional” trade-no-envy if the number of agents is sufficiently large
(Gabszewicz, 1975).
Using no-envy as both procedural and end-state principles of fairness, Kolm
(1972), Feldman and Kirman (1974), Goldman and Sussangkarn (1980), and
Thomson (1982), among others, investigate whether procedural fairness induces
the end-state fairness. The results are negative. The combination of envy-free
initial allocation (equal division) and a sequence of envy-free trades may lead
to a core allocation with envy. Our three main characterization results impose
three versions of no-envy as the principle of end-state fairness and obtain no-
envy, “with some constraints”, of the initial allocation as an implication. We do
ness points towards it. It remains as an open question to find appealing axioms, from a fairness
viewpoint, that would allow to provide a full-fledged characterization of such mechanism in this
context.
37That is, any coalition does not find that it could use the resources allotted to the other equal-
sized coalition in such a way that would make all its members better off than they are with what
has actually been allotted to them.
38With a small number of agents, other mechanisms also exist.
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not impose no-envy as a procedural requirement. Instead, other standard axioms
(such as claims-boundedness, resource monotonicity, and consistency for rights-
assignment, and individual rationality and efficiency for exchange) are used as
procedural requirements.39
In standard exchange economies, Thomson (1983) is also concerned with the
three levels of justice, fair initial position (endowment), fair trade, and end-state
fairness. In his approach, the principle of fair trade plays a central role and the
principle of fair initial position is formulated through the possibility of changing
the initial positions of agents (as in the definition of no-envy) and their objections
based on the principle of fair trade from any reshuffled position. Thus, the key
idea of no-envy is behind his notion of fair initial position. He shows that no-envy
is the unique end-state fairness concept that is obtained from this procedural ap-
proach using individual rationality as the principle of fair trade (Proposition 1).
His main result is to show that Walrasian trade and the principle of fair initial po-
sition defined via Walrasian trade give rise to the same outcomes as the Walrasian
rule from equal division (Proposition 2). In a sense, this result says that if one
accepts Walrasian trade to be a fair rule of trade and the possibility of changing
initial positions among agents, then the only fair initial position is equal division.
Our Theorem 1 reinforces this conclusion in the extended framework and using
a different procedural approach. While Thomson’s procedural approach is hypo-
thetically oriented (reminiscent of the veil of ignorance or the original position) à
la Harsanyi and Rawls, our procedural approach is practically oriented. We deal
with an environment where we face the issue of conflicting claims as well as al-
locating resources. Our procedural approach is practical in the sense that it is
informationally simple and decentralizable and is also representative of actual in-
stitutions. The first procedure of rights assignment allows us to utilize the findings
in the vast literature of claims problems (bankruptcy or taxation problems, surplus
sharing, cost sharing, etc). The second procedure of exchange is assumed to meet
the very basic condition for a decentralized system, individual rationality. Unlike
Thomson (1983), we use no-envy as the end-state fairness axiom and characterize
egalitarian rights assignment mechanisms for the first procedure.
Our model is also related with a model introduced by Thomson (2007).40 The
aim in that model is to formulate appropriate notions of consistency dealing with
the exchange economy augmented by some social deficit to be shared among
39Our model and the procedural approach follow the lesson on procedural fairness delineated
by Thomson (2011, pp.419~422).
40See also Peleg (1996) and Korthues (2000).
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agents. Mathematically, the model of “deficit-sharing exchange economies” (on
p.184, Thomson 2007) is identical to ours, if the deficit T in his model is con-
sidered as the difference between the sum of the claims and the aggregate en-
dowment in our model. However, we do not impose consistency on the whole
procedure of social choice, but impose consistency only on the first procedure
of assignment mechanisms. Thus, due to the claims-boundedness condition for
assignment mechanisms, defining consistency is not an issue in our context.
In the definition of assignment mechanisms, we have imposed the condition
of claims-boundedness. It is a standard condition in the literature of rationing and
can capture, in the most convincingly minimal sense, the thesis of self-ownership
when claims can represent self-ownership rights.41 Nevertheless, one may wonder
about the consequence of dropping the condition. A result similar to Theorem 1,
but without resource monotonicity and full-award-out-consistency, prevails after
replacing the constrained equal awards mechanism with the equal awards (equal
division) mechanism.42 In a sense, Theorem 1 is simplified after dropping claims-
boundedness. However, the other theorems will hold in the same shape as we
currently have them.
To conclude, it is worth mentioning that the validity of our three end-state fair-
ness axioms should be judged context by context. In some applications, claims
may be perceived as indicating “credits”, and in other applications, as indicat-
ing discredits (or responsibility). In bankruptcy problems, claims are investment
amounts; the greater they are, the more credits are attributed to the claimants. On
the other hand, in allocating pollution permits, claims represent past emissions
and greater claims mean greater discredits or more responsibility for the environ-
mental damage.
No-envy fully ignores claims information in judging for fairness. On the
other hand, both sacrifice-no-envy and relative-no-envy make agents’ claims be
the benchmark outcome for fairness judgments. They require that the final out-
come should move away from this benchmark without breaking the particular
“fair” balance across agents, as specified in the two axioms.
When claims are credits, claims deserve special attention in judging for fair-
ness and so no-envy does not qualify as a valid criterion for fairness. In such
scenario, our results pin down proportional and constrained equal losses mecha-
nisms as the only fair assignment mechanisms.
When claims are discredits, using these claims as the benchmark in judging
41See Footnote 12.
42This will follow directly from Lemma 1.
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for fairness, as in sacrifice-no-envy and relative-no-envy, does not go well with
our moral intuition. In particular, when claims represent discredits of past gen-
erations, upon which the advantage of the current generation is based, these two
axioms dismiss “historical accountability”, and our results show that they yield
‘grandfathering’ rules, namely, constrained equal losses and proportional rules.
For example, in allocating GHG emission rights, it is abnormal to ask people in
continuous poverty (and, therefore, with little responsibility for the current GHG
problem) to set their benchmark for fairness to be at their past record of poor con-
sumptions (with almost zero GHG emission) while setting the same benchmark
at the luxurious life style (with high GHG emission) for very rich people. Thus,
in this case, the two axioms can be invalidated right away and no-envy is a valid
axiom for fairness. In such scenario, our results, then, point toward constrained
equal awards as the unique fair assignment mechanism. This is our justification
for the scheme of equal per capita allocation of GHG emission rights. We take as
its moral foundation the axiom of no-envy that is a focal axiom of fairness in Eco-
nomics and Political Philosophy. The axiom of no-envy does not directly involve
the allocation of rights; it emphasizes the welfare consequences of this allocation
upon individual agents. Appendix C gives a formal presentation of this case as an
example of our model.
A Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. As mentioned above, it is straightforward to see that the constrained equal
awards mechanism satisfies resource monotonicity and full-award-out-consistency
and, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social
choice rule satisfying no-envy on E 0. We focus on the converse implication. Let
ϕ be an assignment mechanism satisfying resource monotonicity and full-award-
out-consistency that, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule,
leads to a social choice rule satisfying no-envy on E 0. For each l ∈ {1, . . . ,￿−1},
let C (l)≡ {(N,c,Ω) ∈ C : ∀k ≥ l+1,∀i ∈ N, Ωk/|N|≤ cik}. Let C (￿)≡ C and
C (0)≡ C 0.
We show that ϕ coincides with ϕCEA on C (k) for each k = 0,1, . . . ,￿, using
mathematical induction.
By Lemma 1, ϕ coincides with ϕCEA on C (0). Let l ∈ {1, . . . ,￿− 2}. Sup-
pose, by induction, that ϕ coincides with ϕCEA on C (k) for each k ≤ l. In what
follows, we prove that ϕ coincides with ϕCEA on C (l), which completes the in-
duction argument. Let (N,c,Ω) ∈ C (l). For ease of exposition, assume, without
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loss of generality, that N = {1, . . . ,n} and that claims on the l-th commodity are
increasingly ordered, i.e., c1l ≤ · · ·≤ cnl . For each m ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n}, let43
C (N)(l)m= {(N,c,Ω)∈C (N)(l) :
m−1
∑
i=1
cil+(n−m+1)cml <Ωl ≤
m
∑
i=1
cil+(n−m)c(m+1)l}.
Furthermore, let
C (N)(l)0 = {(N,c,Ω) ∈ C (l) :Ωl ≤ nc1l}.
Then, it is straightforward to see that C (N)(l) =
￿n
m=0C (N)(l)m. Note that, as
C (N)(l)0 ⊂ C (N)(l−1), ϕ coincides with ϕCEA on C (N)(l)0. We now show, by
induction, that it also happens for the remaining subsets in the partition, i.e., for
each m ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, ϕ(N,c,Ω) = ϕCEA(N,c,Ω), for each (N,c,Ω) ∈ C (N)(l)m.
Case m= 1. Let (N,c,Ω) ∈ C (N)(l)1. Then, ϕCEAl (N,c,Ω) = (c1l,λ , . . . ,λ ),
where λ = (Ωl−c1l)/(n−1). Let Ω￿ ∈R￿++ be such that Ω￿l ≡ nc1l and, for each
l￿ ￿= l, Ω￿l￿ ≡ Ωl￿ . Then, (N,c,Ω￿) ∈ C (N)(l− 1) and, therefore, ϕ(N,c,Ω￿) =
ϕCEA(N,c,Ω￿). In particular, ϕl(N,c,Ω￿) = (c1l,c1l, . . . ,c1l) and, for each l￿ ≥ l,
ϕl￿(N,c,Ω￿) = (Ωl￿/n, · · · ,Ωl￿/n). By resource monotonicity, and claims bound-
edness, ϕ1l(N,c,Ω) = c1l .
Now, consider the problem (N\{1},c−1,Ω¯), where Ω¯≡Ω−ϕ1(N,c,Ω). Note
that, for each l￿ ≥ l+ 1, ϕ1l￿(N,c,Ω) = Ωl￿/n and, for each i ∈ N, Ωl￿/n ≤ cil￿ .
Then, Ω¯l￿/(n− 1) = Ωl￿/n ≤ cil￿ , for each i ∈ N. Moreover, as Ω¯l/(n− 1) =
(Ωl − c1l)/(n− 1) ≤ c2l ≤ · · · ≤ cnl , it follows that (N\{1},c−1,Ω¯) ∈ C (l− 1).
Thus, ϕ(N\{1},c−1,Ω¯) = ϕCEA(N\{1},c−1,Ω¯).
By full-award-out-consistency, ϕil(N,c,Ω) = ϕil(N\{1},c−1,Ω¯), for each i ∈
N\{1}. Therefore, ϕil(N,c,Ω) = ϕCEAil (N,c,Ω), for each i ∈ N\{1}, completing
the proof of this case.
Case m→m+1. Suppose then that, for eachm∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}, ϕ(N,c,Ω)=
ϕCEA(N,c,Ω), for each (N,c,Ω) ∈ C (N)(l)m. Let (N,c,Ω) ∈ C (N)(l)m+1. We
aim to show that ϕ(N,c,Ω) = ϕCEA(N,c,Ω). Note that, ϕCEAl (N,c,Ω) =
(c1l, . . . ,cm−1,l,λ , . . . ,λ ), where λ = [Ω−∑m−1k=1 ckl]/(n−m+1).
Let Ω￿ ≡ ∑m−1k=1 ckl + (n−m+ 1)c(m−1)l . Then, (N,c,Ω￿) ∈ C (N)(l)m, and,
therefore, ϕ(N,c,Ω￿) = ϕCEA(N,c,Ω￿). In particular, for each k ≤ m − 1,
ϕkl(N,c,Ω￿) = ckl . As Ω￿l￿ = Ωl￿ , for each l
￿ ￿= l, it follows, by resource mono-
tonicity, that ϕil￿(N,c,Ω) = ϕil￿(N,c,Ω￿) and ϕCEAil￿ (N,c,Ω) = ϕ
CEA
il￿ (N,c,Ω
￿), for
each i∈N. Therefore, for each l￿ ￿= l and i∈N, ϕil￿(N,c,Ω) = ϕCEAil￿ (N,c,Ω). As,
43We use the notational convention that ∑0i=1 ci = 0.
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for each i≤ m−1, ϕil(N,c,Ω￿) = ckl , then, by resource monotonicity and claims
boundedness, ϕil(N,c,Ω) = cil , for each i≤ m−1.
Finally, let Ω¯ ≡ Ω−∑m−1i=1 ϕi(N,c,Ω). Then Ω¯l = Ωl −∑m−1i=1 cil . By full-
award-out-consistency, ϕil(N,c,Ω) = ϕil({m, . . . ,n},(cm, . . . ,cn),Ω¯), for each i ∈
N\{1, . . . ,m− 1}. As ({m, . . . ,n},(cm, . . . ,cn),Ω¯) ∈ C (l − 1), it follows that
ϕil(N,c,Ω) = ϕCEAil (N,c,Ω), for each i≤ m−1, which completes the proof.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. As mentioned above, it is straightforward to see that the constrained equal
losses mechanism satisfies resource monotonicity and zero-award-out-consistency
and, when combined with an individually rational exchange rule, leads to a social
choice rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on E ∗. We focus on the converse impli-
cation. Let ϕ be an assignment mechanism satisfying resource monotonicity and
zero-award-out-consistency that, when combined with an individually rational ex-
change rule, leads to a social choice rule satisfying sacrifice-no-envy on E ∗.
Let C ∗(￿) ≡ C and C ∗(0) ≡ C ∗. For each l ∈ {1, . . . ,￿− 1}, let C ∗(l) ≡
{(N,c,Ω) ∈ C : ∀k ≥ l+1,∀i ∈ N, (∑ j∈N c jk−Ωk)/|N|≤ cik}.
We show that ϕ coincides with ϕCEL on C ∗(l) for each l = 0,1, . . . ,￿, using
mathematical induction.
By Lemma 2, ϕ coincides with ϕCEL on C ∗(0). Let l ∈ {1, . . . ,￿− 2}. Sup-
pose, by induction, that ϕ coincides with ϕCEL on C ∗(k). for each k ≤ l. In what
follows, we prove that ϕ coincides with ϕCEL on C ∗(l), which completes the in-
duction argument.Let (N,c,Ω) ∈ C ∗(l). For ease of exposition, assume, without
loss of generality, that N = {1, . . . ,n} and that claims on the l-th commodity are
increasingly ordered, i.e., c1l ≤ · · ·≤ cnl . For each m ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1} let
C (l)m= {(N,c,Ω)∈C (l) :
n
∑
i=m+1
cil−(n−m)c(m+1)l ≤Ω<
n
∑
i=m
cil−(n−m+1)cml}.
Furthermore, let
C (l)0 = {(N,c,Ω) ∈ C (l) :Ωl ≥
n
∑
i=1
cil−nc1l}.
Then, it is straightforward to see that C ∗(l) =
￿n−1
m=0C (l)m. Note that, as C (l)0 ⊂
C ∗(l− 1), ϕ coincides with ϕCEL on C (l)0. We now show, by induction, that it
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also happens for the remaining subsets of the partition, i.e., for eachm∈ {1, . . . ,n},
ϕ(N,c,Ω) = ϕCEL(N,c,Ω), for each (N,c,Ω) ∈ C (l)m.
Case m= 1.
Let (N,c,Ω) ∈ C (l)1. Then, ϕCELl (N,Ω,c) = (c1l,λ , . . . ,λ ), where
λ = (∑ni=2 cil−Ωl)/(n−1).
Let Ω￿ ∈R￿++ be such that Ω￿l ≡∑i∈N cil−nc1l and, for each l￿ ￿= l, Ω￿l￿ ≡Ωl￿ .
Note that (N,Ω￿,c) ∈ C ∗(l−1) and
ϕCELil (N,Ω
￿,c) = (0,c2l− c1l,c3l− c1l, . . . ,cnl− c1l)
Thus, ϕ(N,Ω￿,c) = ϕCEL(N,Ω￿,c). In particular, ϕ1l(N,Ω￿,c) = 0, whereas
ϕil￿(N,Ω￿,c) = cil￿ − [∑ j∈N c jl￿ −Ωl￿ ]/n. As Ω￿l￿ =Ωl￿ for each l￿ ￿= l, by resource
monotonicity, ϕil￿(N,c,Ω) = ϕil￿(N,c,Ω￿) = ϕCELil￿ (N,c,Ω
￿) = ϕCELil￿ (N,c,Ω), for
each i∈N. In particular, ϕil￿(N,c,Ω)= cil￿ − [∑ j∈N c jl￿ −Ωl￿ ]/n, for each l￿ ≥ l+1
and i ∈ N. By resource monotonicity, and non-negativity, ϕ1l(N,Ω,c) = 0.
Now, consider the problem (N\{1},c−i,Ω¯), where Ω¯≡Ω−ϕ1(N,c,Ω). It is
not difficult to show that (N\{1},c−i,Ω¯) ∈ C ∗(l − 1). Therefore,
ϕ(N\{1},c−1,Ω¯) = ϕCEL(N\{1},c−1,Ω¯). By zero-award-out-consistency,
ϕ(N\{1},Ω¯,c−1)=ϕN\{1}(N,Ω,c), and ϕN\{1}(N,Ω,c)=ϕCEL(N\{1},c−1,Ω¯).
Note that ϕ1(N,c,Ω) = ϕCEL1 (N,c,Ω). By consistency, ϕCEL(N\{1},c−1,Ω¯) =
ϕCELN\{1}(N,c,Ω). Therefore, ϕN\{1}(N,Ω,c) = ϕ
CEL
N\{1}(N,Ω,c), completing the
proof for the case m= 1.
Case m→m+1. Suppose then that, for eachm∈ {1,2, . . . ,n−1}, ϕ(N,c,Ω)=
ϕCEL(N,c,Ω), for each (N,c,Ω) ∈ C (l)m. Let (N,c,Ω) ∈ C (l)m+1. We aim
to show that ϕ(N,c,Ω) = ϕCEL(N,c,Ω). Note that, ϕCELl (N,c,Ω) = (0, . . . ,0,
c(m+2)l−λ , . . . ,cnl−λ ), where λ = ∑
n
i=m+2 cil−Ωl
n−m−1 . Let t > 0 be such that cm+1,l =
∑ni=m+1 cil−(Ωl+t)
n−m . Let Ω
￿ ∈ R￿++ be such that Ω￿l ≡ Ωl + t and Ω￿l￿ = Ωl￿ , for each
l￿ ￿= l. Then, ϕCELl (N,c,Ω) = (0, . . . ,0,c(m+2)l − λ ￿, . . . ,cnl − λ ￿), where λ ￿ ≡
∑ni=m+1 cil−(Ωl+t)
n−m . Furthermore, (N,c,Ω
￿) ∈ C (l)m, and, therefore, ϕ(N,c,Ω￿) =
ϕCEL(N,c,Ω￿). In particular, for each i ≤ m+ 1, ϕil(N,Ω￿,c) = 0. Then, by re-
source monotonicity, ϕil(N,Ω,c) = 0= ϕCELil (N,Ω,c), for each i≤ m+1. Also,
as Ω￿l￿ = Ωl￿ for each l
￿ ￿= l, then, by resource monotonicity, ϕil￿(N,Ω￿,c) =
ϕil￿(N,Ω,c) and ϕCEL(N,Ω￿,c) = ϕCEL(N,Ω,c). From here, it follows that
ϕil￿(N,Ω,c) = ϕCELil￿ (N,Ω,c), for each i ∈ N and l￿ ￿= l.
Finally, let N￿ ≡ {m+ 2, . . . ,n} and consider the problem (N￿,Ω¯,cN￿) where
Ω¯≡Ω−∑m+1i=1 ϕi(N,c,Ω) =Ω−∑m+1i=1 ϕCELi (N,c,Ω).
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By zero-award-out-consistency,
ϕ jl(N￿,Ω¯,cN￿) = ϕ jl(N,Ω,c),
for each j ∈ N￿. Now, as (N￿,Ω¯,cN￿) ∈ C ∗(l),
ϕ(N￿,Ω¯,cN￿) = ϕCEL(N￿,Ω¯,cN￿).
As ϕCEL(N￿,Ω¯,cN￿) = ϕCELN￿ (N,Ω,c),
ϕ jl(N,Ω,c) = ϕCELjl (N,Ω,c),
for each j ∈ N￿, which completes the proof.
C Allocating rights for greenhouse gas emission: A
simple general equilibrium model
Consider a simple general equilibriummodel of allocating GHG (green house gas)
emission rights. There are two goods, energy x and money m for buying all other
goods. Assume that energy can be produced using money under a constant returns
to scale technology with a fixed marginal cost of κ ≥ 0. Each consumer i is en-
dowed with money Mi used to consume energy x¯i. The total energy consumption
should be reduced to E where E ≤ ∑i∈N x¯i.
Consider a scheme of cap-and-trade with the total energy consumption capped
at E. In order for each i ∈ N to consume xi units of energy, i needs to purchase
the same units of permit at price r. An allocation (xi,mi)i∈N is feasible if ∑i xi ≤
E and ∑i∈N mi + κ∑i∈N xi ≤ ∑i∈NMi, where the first inequality means that the
aggregate energy consumption (also quantity of permit demand) does not exceed
the aggregate energy supply (also permit supply) and the second inequality means
that the total money demand (by consumers and the energy producer who uses
money to produce energy) does not exceed the total money supply. When i ∈ N
has initial permit endowment ei, i’s budget constraint can be written as (κ+r)xi+
mi ≤ rei+Mi. A cap-and-trade equilibrium is composed of permit price r∗ and
allocation (x∗i ,m∗i )i∈N such that (x∗i ,m∗i )i∈N is feasible and, for each i∈N, (x∗i ,m∗i )
maximizes i’s preferences over the set of bundles satisfying i’s budget constraint.
This model of cap-and-trade can be transformed into our model as follows.
Let p≡ κ+ r. Then i’s budget constraint with i’s permit endowment ei is written
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as pxi +mi ≤ pei +Mi− κei. Let ci ≡ (x¯i,Mi) be i’s claims profile. Let Ω ≡
(E,∑i∈NMi−κE) be the social endowment of the two goods, permit (or energy)
and money (net of inputs used to produce E units of energy). Now, with this social
endowment, associating individual endowments (property rights over permit and
money)ωi≡ (ωie,ωim) (∑i∈Nωi =Ω), anyWalrasian equilibrium under the initial
endowments with price p∗ and allocation (x∗i ,m∗i ) coincides with the cap-and-
trade equilibrium under the permit allocation (ωie)i∈N , with permit price r∗ ≡
p∗ −κ .
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